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Abstract. Security demands are increasing for all types of organisa-
tions due to the ever-closer integration of computing infrastructures and
smart devices into all aspects of the organisational operations. Conse-
quently, the need for security-aware employees in every role of an or-
ganisation increases in accordance. Cyber Range training emerges as a
promising solution, allowing employees to train in both realistic environ-
ments and scenarios and gain hands-on experience in security aspects
of varied complexity, depending on their role and level of expertise. To
that end, this work introduces a model-driven approach for Cyber Range
training that facilitates the generation of tailor-made training scenarios
based on a comprehensive model-based description of the organisation
and its security postures. Additionally, our approach facilitates the auto-
mated deployment of such training environments, tailored to each defined
scenario, through simulation and emulation means. To further highlight
the usability of the proposed approach, this work also presents scenar-
ios focusing on phishing threats, with increasing level of complexity and
difficulty.
Keywords: Cyber Range training · Model Driven Engineering · Secu-
rity Assurance
1 Introduction
The insufficient knowledge of security procedures and the lack of security aware-
ness across different types of employees within an organisation, combined with
the rapid technological advancements (e.g., 5G, the Internet of Things - IoT)[1]
that transform various domains (e.g., energy, health-care), provide fertile ground
for various threat actors (sophisticated or otherwise) to carry out successful at-
tacks that may significantly damage tangible and intangible assets [2]. Organ-
isations, own or access a vast number of cyber systems that can be exposed
through numerous known and unknown attack vectors. As organisations tech-
nologically advance, the complexity of their systems and their security advances
accordingly. However, the security awareness and security expertise of employees
does not follow the same pace. This is especially critical for organisations that
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handle sensitive data (e.g., hospitals [3]) or are part of critical infrastructures
(e.g., smart energy grids [4]). Therefore, to protect their assets and mitigate po-
tential attacks, such organisations need to train their employees to appropriately
respond to the security challenges of this era. This includes educating them with
the latest learning resources that will allow them to comprehend the security
related changes introduced by the new technologies and giving them access to
training scenarios that realistically represent situations that may occur in their
organisation. In this manner, Cyber Range training that lacks the ability to fit
the requirements of an organisation and to easily adapt to the rapidly evolving
landscape, is insufficient, and quickly becomes obsolete. Thus, the importance
for a dynamic and continuously up-to-date cyber security training environment
emerges.
Motivated by the above, this work aims to highlight the potential of model-
driven Cyber-Range training that: (i) is applicable to any type of a system, (ii)
is able to represent the actual assets of an organisation and generate training
scenarios based on them, (iii) offers scalability and adaptability, by enabling
adjustments to the model as the organisation evolves, (iv) is up-to-date regarding
threat intelligence, considering new vulnerabilities discovered [5]) or changes
to the organisation’s setup (e.g., adding new systems that may introduce new
vulnerabilities).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II presents an
overview of the background, related works and how the proposed approach over-
comes the limitations of current commercial solutions. Section III describes the
adopted security assurance methodology. Section IV provides a detailed model
of an example scenario and two variations. Finally, Section V summarises the
paper and sets future goals.
2 Background & Related Work
This work is based on the definition of a security assurance model, adopting and
extending state of the art approaches in model-driven cyber assurance and certi-
fication, simulation, emulation, and e-training cyber range tools and platforms.
The security assurance’s focus is to evaluate ICT systems, products and ser-
vices with regard to security standards and security properties [6]. To achieve
this, the proposed approach follows certification schemes such as CUMULUS
[7], an open source model-driven framework, capable of automatically execut-
ing different types of certification schemes for cloud services. CUMULUS was
introduced to close the gap of automation that other certification frameworks
lacked (STAR [8], ECSTA [9]). In this work, cyber training leverages the contin-
uous security assurance enabled by the assurance model to use its elements (e.g.,
Threats, Security Controls, monitoring evidence) and create realistic simulations
for Cyber Range training programmes, while monitoring the assurance schemes
to measure the performance of the trainees following training.
To cover the needs for the implementation of the training environment, sev-
eral tools for simulation and emulation can be considered to support the au-
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tomatic deployment of emulated components and facilitate the communication
across simulated and real assets (see Section 3.2). The Cyber-Range sub-model’s
simulation requirements includes the ability of it to accommodate a detailed rep-
resentation of simulation environments and its components in order to support
automatic generation of the simulation demands of the training programme. As
a result, several open source discrete event-driven simulators were examined.
The NS-3 [10] provides support of TCP, routing and multicast protocols over
wired and wireless networks and has the ability to run software on simulated
models. GNS3 [11] is an open source network simulator mainly focuses on Cisco
and Jupiter software. Netkit [12] is a command-line based simulator tool that
uses user-mode linux to create network nodes. Finally, OMNet++ [13] is another
open source discrete event simulator that offers a highly scalable and modular
framework primarily for building any-kind of network (e.g., wired, wireless, on-
chip) simulators. OMNet’s community is vast providing domain-specific support
for sensor networks, wireless ad-hoc networks, internet protocols, performance
modelling, photonic networks etc. Considering the emulation requirements, two
major virtualisaton tools are OpenStack [14] that features deployment and man-
agement of virtual machines and Docker [15] that uses an engine to host con-
tainers of virtualised software.
Considering external sources for keeping the security assurance model up to
date with changes in the threat landscape, various established cyber security
threat and vulnerability lists can be considered; e.g., OWASP [16], ENISA[17],
NIST[5]. Additionally, state of the art research efforts such as project CIPSEC
[18] can provide valuable insights on personnel training courses, know-how on
forensics analysis tools and education for protection against cascading effects.
Furthermore, various products established in the market of Cyber Training
must be considered in order to identify gaps and needs of this domain. Kasper-
sky Interactive Protection Simulation (KIPS) [19] targets senior managers and
decision makers to increase their security awareness by offering 6 scenarios (i.e.,
Corporation, Bank, eGovernment, Transport, Power Station, Water Plant) with
related types of attacks. The Adaptive Awareness Portal [20] offers modular
means for building your own training programmes but it emphasises on secu-
rity awareness training, social engineering scenarios and e-learning management.
Sophos Phish Threat [21] is another phishing training solution that utilises phish-
ing simulations to educate and tests its end users. Inspired e-learning’s Security
Awareness Training [22] is a role-based solution educating against phishing sce-
nario via a combination of videos and immersive situation-based role-playing sce-
narios. Finally, literature [23] [24] indicates that the gamification of cyber range
training offers promising results. This approach is followed by PwC’s Game of
Threats [25]; a solution that simulates cyber security breaches and uses gamifica-
tion and game theory to provide a realistic game environment for an interactive
blue team / red team experience. While there are various solutions in the mar-
ket, most offer a fixed number of scenarios, role/domain specific limitations,
minimal automation, and often lack the interaction with actual emulated cyber
environments, thus lacking in realism.
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3 Security Assurance Modelling
The proposed model-driven approach to Cyber-Range training is based on the
definition of a Security Assurance Model that enables the systematic represen-
tation of the target organisation, its assets and their relations, and, ultimately,
its security postures. This comprehensive approach allows us to: (a) identify and
describe the assets of the system, their relations and their corresponding threats,
(b) the sequence of events that leads to the manifestation of these threats along-
side the responsible threat actor(s), (c) the actions that trainees are expected
to take against these attacks and the tools that may be used for this purpose,
(d) targets regarding the preparedness and effectiveness level that the trainees
targeted by a Cyber-Range training programme are expected to achieve and how
these levels may be measured in different stages of the delivery of the programme
and, (e), information on how the system can simulate and emulate the compo-
nents necessary for its implementation. Additionally, it supports the effortless
integration of potential changes in the composition of the organisation to the
model (e.g., hiring a person, introducing a different job role, acquiring a soft-
ware or hardware, removing old hardware, the disclosure of new vulnerabilities
etc.), and enabling the generation of updated or brand-new Cyber Range train-
ing scenarios driven by these changes. To support the training, the core model is
extended with the Cyber-Range sub-model that provides training relevant infor-
mation. This allows it to build custom training scenarios for: (a) known cyber-
attacks, (b) new cyber-attacks, (c) learning how to effectively and systematically
utilise different security tools, and (d) learning the procedure for various types
of actions (e.g., preparedness, detection and analysis, incident response, post
incident response) and security processes in the target organisations and avail-
ability for different types of users of the system (e.g., end-user, administrator,
technician, security engineer, blue/red team). This approach allows us to provide
automated means for generation of tailored Cyber-Range training programmes
that align with the organisations composition and security requirements. The
core assurance model and the Cyber-Range sub-model will be described in the
following sections.
3.1 The Security Assurance Model
The core of the defined security assurance model are the organisations assets (i.e.,
anything of value to the organisation), as well as the interplay between threats,
vulnerabilities, security properties and security controls. For the sake of brevity,
a view of the assurance model depicting the above is shown in Fig 1. In the
above, an asset can be a software asset (Software Architecture Layer (SAL) or
Physical Architecture Layer (PAL)), a hardware asset, a physical infrastructure
asset, data, person or a process. An asset inherits a number of attributes that
are grouped into a single element namely the SecurityAssuranceModelElement.
The status of this element must be equal to final in order for an asset to have all
its attributes/interconnections set. An asset may have security properties and
be subject to vulnerabilities. A security property can be of type (a) integrity, (b)
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Fig. 1. Core Security Assurance Model
confidentiality, (c) availability etc.. It also contains a verification attribute which
describes the way a security property is verified and a specification of it. A secu-
rity property is addressed by security control(s) and may be required by assets.
Threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversary impact an
asset through unauthorised access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data,
and/or denial of services. A threat exploits a number of vulnerabilities and vio-
lates a number of security properties. Vulnerability is a weakness an adversary
could take advantage of to comprise the security properties of a resources. A
vulnerability, applies to a number of assets and is exploited by a threat which
may lead to the violation of a security property if a security control is not in
place or properly set up and can either be of physical or computational type.
The latter applies to a computational asset (i.e., a Software or Hardware asset)
and (mostly) follows the structure provided by National Vulnerability Database
(NVD) while the former applies to a physical asset. Finally, a security control
protects assets, addresses security properties and mitigates vulnerabilities. For
the sake of brevity, a view of the assurance model depicting the above is shown
in 1.
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3.2 Cyber-Range Sub-Model
The Cyber-Range sub-model is developed to provide essential information for
the specification and implementation of the Cyber-Range training programmes.
To accomplish this, the Cyber-Range sub-model extends the security assurance
core model in the sense of utilising certain elements from it. Specifically, to
generate training scenarios tailored to a target cyber system, the cyber range
sub-model considers the systems assets, threats, security properties and security
controls. For example, if a system is not prone to phishing attacks, then the cyber
range sub-model will not generate a phishing training scenario. Furthermore, to
generate different types of difficulty and execution steps of a training scenario,
the cyber-range sub model considers information about a person asset (i.e., its
role within the organisation). For instance, if an organisation does not have any
security experts, then scenarios targeting this role will not be generated. Addi-
tionally, the core security assurance model defines the sequence of events that
lead to the manifestation of the threats which is utilised by the Cyber-Range
sub- model to drive the different phases of the training scenario. Subsequently
the Cyber-Range sub-model defines the threat actors (e.g., external attacker,
insider) that cause the aforementioned sequence of events, as it is important for
the purposes of the training. The Cyber-Range sub-model extends the network
module of the core security assurance model to support virtual networking re-
quired for the communication between the emulations Virtual Machines (VM).
This information (i.e., as a class) can also be of use to the security assurance
model to support interactions between virtual systems within the actual cyber-
system. Finally, Cyber-Range sub-model uses the organisations software assets
to describe the components of the emulation and makes use of the inheritance
and other associations with the asset. For example, the containment relationship
between assets is utilised by the emulation to describe the link between a VM
and its operating system. The diagram of the model is provided in the form of
a Unified Modelling Language (UML) class diagram (see figure 2) together with
a detailed description below.
The Training Programme is specified by a brief description of the pro-
gramme such as: (a) a measurable goal for the training (e.g., in a phishing sce-
nario, the trainee has to identify at least 50 percent of the phishing emails), (b)
roles that the programme aims to train (e.g., end-user, administrator, techni-
cian, security engineer), (c) types of training (e.g., analysis, detection, prepared-
ness, security awareness), (d) legal frameworks that align with the programme
(e.g., GDPR compliance scenario) and (e) a difficulty value that indicates the
difficulty rating (e.g., a phishing training scenario could be represented very
simply to considerably complex).
The training programme covers one or more Assets, Threats and Secu-
rity Properties and zero or more Security Controls. For example, a phishing
scenario concerning an end-user’s asset, covers a phishing specific threat, that
involves the confidentiality security property and involve a spam filter as a secu-
rity control. In this example, if the target organisation does not employ a spam
filter, then it wont be included in the training.
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The training programme records zero or more actual trace evidence for
debugging or training reasons, including system and traffic logs. The training
programme sets one or more expected trace to track the progress of a user
during its training. For instance,if an end-user examines a malicious email that
contains a link, the expected trace is to monitor if the user presses the link or
not. In this example, the training programme is not concerned with any actual
trace. However, if this scenario involves a security expert - instead of an end-
user - that needs to investigate the origins of the aforementioned link, then the
training programme will need to monitor the actual trace to follow the users
investigation path (e.g., packets send).
The training programme supports the training programme executions.
This class defines the actions enabled for the training programme considering
the role of the account undergoing the training (e.g., in a phishing scenario the
end user would not have the same actions enabled as a security engineer or ad-
ministrator would do). The account class is utilised by one or more person(s).
For example, a red team/blue team might have a single account for training their
team members. Another example is an account that can be used by a security
engineer that wants to train different roles (e.g. the system admin, forensics,
blue/red team etc).
The training programme consists of phases; the stages that the programme
is deployed. In some cases, this class is driven by a sequence of events that
leads to the specific manifestation of a threat generated by one or more threat
actor(s) or ,in other cases, this represent stages of the training scenario(e.g.,
when it comes to a blue/red team scenario, phase 1 consists of the blue team
securing the system and phases 2 the red team trying to exploit it while blue
team defends it).
The implementation of the Cyber Range training will be accomplished through
emulation and simulation of the components and the interactions among them.
In some cases, where the training requires an additional level of realism, in-
teractions with real assets (e.g., specialised devices like Global Position System
(GPS), or actual devices like an email server), will be accommodated as well. The
Cyber range model will provide the necessary information and links to resources
to support the automated deployment of the playable training programmes via
various simulation (e.g., OMNet++) and emulation tools (e.g., OpenStack). This
information is described in the simulation and emulation sub-models. A training
programme, based on its deployment phases, may involve more than one simula-
tion and emulation sub-models. For instance, a training programme may deploy
one virtual machine with a set of configurations for the implementation of its first
phase and an additional virtual machine with different configurations for its sec-
ond phase, or more than one virtual machines for its third phase. Similarly, the
simulation model of training programme may deploy a simulation environment
on one phase and a different simulation environment on another phase.
Simulation Sub-Model The Simulation Sub-Model is responsible for indicat-
ing if a component can be simulated and describes the simulation environment
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Fig. 2. Cyber-Range sub-model
and its individual components. The simulation model specifies: (a) if an asset
can be simulated, (b) the deployment mode for the simulated component (e.g.,
build from scratch or by using a template), (c) which tool is used to realise the
simulation (e.g., OMNet++, NS3 etc.) (d) the required initialisation operations
(e.g., instantiating scripts), (e) the time and date that the simulation started
and ended, (f) the current simulation and date time, (g) the execution speed
that describes how fast the simulation is passing, (h) the random seed value
that influences the random operations of the simulation in order to have repro-
ducible randomness and (i) the list of messages that are exchanged among the
simulations modules (e.g., events, commands, packets) during the simulation.
Additionally, the simulation sub-model facilitates different simulation environ-
ments if required by different phases of the training programme. To describe the
composition, the model follows the paradigm of the Network Description (NED)
language, used by the discrete simulator OMNet++, which describes the sim-
ulation environment as topology of modules and connections between them.A
module is a node in the composition of the simulation, it has a distinctive name,
it can be either a simple or compound module and supports communication with
other modules via gates.
A compound module, consists of one or more modules (i.e., simple or
compound). It has one or more gates that enable the communication across
modules in the compound system and the modules outside of it.
A simple module, contains source code, specifying the behaviour of a sim-
ulated component (e.g., hardware, software), it involves one or more gates to
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enable the communication with other modules and uses operations to handle
messages.
Gates, can either be of type input, output and in-out and serve as the
connection points between two modules.
A connection, links two gates and has a specific behaviour defined by char-
acteristics. The main characteristics are the data-rate and the delay, however, a
variety of them are supported. All objects of the simulation model can be further
specified by a set of parameters and properties.
Parameters, are variables that further define an object. They can hold dif-
ferent primitive data types (e.g., integer, double, boolean, string etc.) or even
complex ones (e.g., XML). For example, for a simple module simulating an Ap-
plication, a set of parameters may define the communication protocol (e.g., UDP,
TCP, ICMP), destination address, packet length of message(s) etc.
Properties are various meta-data that can be attached to objects of the
simulation model. For example, properties can be statistics that are needed to
track the progress of a trainee, such as end-to-end delay, jitter etc. Properties
can also be rendering information of the specific object for the GUI.
Emulation Sub-Model The emulation sub-model indicates if a component
can be emulated and is responsible for defining the information required by the
training programme to emulate components and facilitate connections between
them with simulated components and possibly external real assets (e.g., external
email server via the internet). Thus, the emulation sub-model includes informa-
tion about the resources for instantiating and configuring the various emulated
components, the deployment mode for them (e.g., from scratch, or by utilising
a template) and the tool that will carry out the emulation (e.g., OpenStack).
The resources involve images (i.e., software and OS settings), hardware char-
acteristics (e.g., memory, Central Processing Unit (CPU) cores, storage) and
connections details (e.g., internal connection of OpenStack resources or external
communication).
The emulation sub-model describes the emulation environment as a structure
of one or more software assets and one or more virtual network modules.
Software assets are a set of programs used to operate computers and exe-
cute specific tasks. Software can either be of type SAL or PAL. SAL is an appli-
cation later software module (e.g., the sources code of a software implemented
within the organisation) whereas PAL is a platform level software, which de-
scribes an abstract software platform (e.g., a virtual machine, web server etc.).
Software asset inherits the containment association from the asset class. This
indicates that an asset can contain or be managed by another asset. A contain-
ment can illustrate a deployment relation if an asset is contained in another asset
and it operates within the containment. For instance, a software asset can be
contained in a hardware asset, a software (SAL) operates in a virtual machine
(PAL) and an Operating System (OS) controls the virtual machine.
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The virtual network module, specifies the network configuration informa-
tion necessary to support the communication between the emulated nodes, such
as IP address, netmask, protocol and routing.
Finally, the emulation sub-model supports one or more phases, supporting the
capability to modify the emulated components throughout the training scenario,
according to the different phases that the training programme consists of.
4 Sample Scenario
In this section, one variant of training focused around phishing attacks is used to
demonstrate the use of the proposed approach. This training involves a simple
phishing scenario where the trainee analyses a sequence of emails to identify
their legitimacy or malicious intent.
4.1 Simple Phishing Scenario
This is a social engineering scenario that targets trainees with low security ex-
pertise. In this simple scenario the user is trained on identifying phishing email
attempts. The user logs into the Cyber Range application and is presented with
a sequence of emails. Their target is to select which of them are legitimate or
malicious.
Scenario Modelling By using the Cyber-Range sub-model the above sce-
nario is specified below. The Training Programme class includes a description
(i.e., Simple Phishing Scenario), a goal (i.e., identify 50 percent of the malicious
emails), a type (i.e., preparedness), role (i.e., low privilege end-user), difficulty
(i.e., 1), . The actual trace that the training programme records include, system
logs, traffic logs and the fake emails that were generated during this scenario.
The expected trace that the training programme sets include the correct and
wrong answers of the user. The Training Programme Execution class defines
that the only actions allowed to the user is to indicate, via the Cyber Range soft-
ware, if an email is legitimate or malicious. This scenario has only one phase,
that is the presentation of the email sequence; when that phase concludes the
scenario completed. The Simulation Model defines that the deployment mode
for this scenario is ”from scratch”; the tool that is used to implement the sim-
ulation is ”Omnet”; the simulation timer starts with 0; messages that contain
events; specifically the event that starts the simulation, 10 emails with varying
states (i.e., legitimate or malicious), and the event that concludes the simula-
tion; the randomness seed is set to 1; execution speed is set to 1; the starting
time and date of the simulation is 20:00 25/8/2019; the end time and date of
the simulation is 21:00 25/8/2019. The simulation topology consists of a simple
module, an email generator application. The Emulation Model defines that
the deployment mode for this scenario is ”preset”; the tool that is used to im-
plement the emulation is ”Open-Stack”; and also provides a path to the preset
template ”/path/simplePhishingVM”. The emulation sub-model consists of one
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Software-PAL asset (virtual machine) that will contain two Software-SAL assets
1) the operating system ”Linux” 2) the simulation software. The scenario’s em-
Fig. 3. Cyber-Range sub-model
ulated and simulated components are displayed in figure 3, while the populated
model for this scenario is displayed in figure 4.
5 Conclusions & Future work
This paper presented a model-driven approach to Cyber-Range training based
on the definition of a security assurance model, extending it to facilitate the def-
inition of Cyber-Range training programmes, via the Cyber-Range sub-model.
Taking into consideration applicability and scalability, we developed the Cyber-
Range sub-model in order to offer realistic training scenarios by using a hybrid
approach of simulation and emulation, which satisfy the security training de-
mands tailored to any specific organisation. While the security assurance model
is used to model the organisation as a whole, the Cyber-Range sub-model fa-
cilitates the specification, implementation and automatic generation of Cyber-
Range training programmes. To this end, the Cyber-Range sub-model links the
Assets, Security Properties, Security Controls, and Threats covered in the sce-
nario and defines it, in terms of training information (e.g., description of the
12 I. Somarakis et al.
Fig. 4. Cyber-Range sub-model
scenario, goal), simulation (e.g., simulation tool, components) and emulation
(e.g., emulation tool, components). This approach, along with the integration of
state of the art simulation and emulation solutions, enables the automated de-
ployment of cyber range training programmes tailored the specific organisation,
in realistic environments, while also considering changes in the threat landscape
(as encompassed in the assurance model).
Next steps will focus on further refining the Cyber-Range sub-model, test-
ing its applicability in more complex and advanced scenarios, clearly defining
the goal and scoring functions supported by the model for trainee performance
evaluation. Special focus will be given on improving the simulation and emula-
tion sub-models and integrating additional simulation and emulation tools [26]
design. Moreover, the aim is to develop and demonstrate a proof of concept con-
verting a Cyber-Range sub-model to a playable training scenario. Finally, the
applicability of the proposed approach will be investigated in different domains,
covering smart home, health-care, smart shipping environments.
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